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WAR OVER MEASURE
LATIN AMERICAN CULTURAL POLICY AND THE
PEDAGOGY OF NEOLIBERAL STATES
Bret Leraul

I

n a seminal 1969 paper in the field of cultural and welfare
economics, Alan Peacock broached the now-classic debate about the
economic rationale for state support for the arts (Throsby 2006, 19).
Fifty years later, the debate rages on as governments around the
world—in particular, those of developing economies—come to recognize the economic value and social utility of culture and seek to
foment production, consumption, and export of intellectual property
intensive-goods and services (Streeten, 402). In an era of ostensibly
decreasing state involvement in national economies, why do states
continue to subsidize cultural production while cutting other social
welfare spending? This apparent paradox raises the question: what is
the insertion of cultural production into the imaginary of the neoliberal state?
Prompted by the nearly simultaneous creation of the Mexican and
Chilean ministries of culture in 2015, this article will address this question in these two contexts. Chile is widely regarded as the first and
perhaps most radical experiment in neoliberal governance. In the context of the Cold War, the electoral victory of socialist president Salvador Allende in 1970 was met by class warfare ending in the 1973
military coup. A small but influential group of young economists at the
Universidad Católica—the Chicago Boys, so called for having trained at
the University of Chicago—found in Augusto Pinochet a sympathetic
ear for their radical policies. And in the absence of democratic representation and with civil society cowed by state violence, they found a
political vacuum ripe for the implementation of these policies. Since the
1990 transition from neoliberal dictatorship to neoliberal democracy,
Cultural Critique 115—Spring 2022—Copyright 2022 Regents of the University of Minnesota
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the government has founded bureaucracies to coordinate and implement policies to grow the culture sector, culminating in the 2015 creation of the Ministry of Culture.
Through a close reading of the textual production of the Ministry’s
predecessor, the National Council for Culture and the Arts (Consejo
Nacional de la Cultura y las Artes) (CNCA), I contend that Chile’s
nascent cultural policy has less to do with the official narrative of economic development, in any traditional sense, than with instituting and
inculcating the notion of culture as capital. This in turn complements
what I see as neoliberalism’s principal innovation: the discursive transformation of labor into human capital. By promoting cultural production as a model for self-entrepreneurship and speculative practices of
self-valorization, the cultural policy of the neoliberal state acculturates
us to precarity as bearers of human capital.1
Mexico’s transition to neoliberalism was more gradual than Chile’s
due to the long shadow of the Mexican Revolution and the massive
state bureaucracy developed over seventy years of rule by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Nonetheless, years of recession in
the 1980s, monetary crisis in the 1990s, and the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) succeeded in implementing a neoliberal
state within the shell of a revolutionary one. Mexican cultural policy
since the late 1980s is less about extending an economistic rationality
to realms once considered marginally economic or noneconomic, as
in Chile, and more about perpetuating a culture of favor. I claim that
this politics of discretion in cultural policy mirrors the informal sector
of the Mexican economy from which value is increasingly captured
via the financialization of popular life.
We can think of these two strategies—practices for valorizing
informality and self-valorizing one’s labor—as two lessons about life
under neoliberalism that cultural policy in Mexico and Chile teaches
to those it touches. My pedagogical language is justified by the fact
that cultural and educational policy have been historically linked in
Latin America. Moreover, modern state education and discourses of
economic development share roots in nineteenth-century liberalism
and positivism, which nourished Latin America’s recently independent
states. As such, Latin American cultural policy has traditionally placed
culture in service of education understood as progress toward Western
models of civilization. In the twentieth century, cultural and educational
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policy slowly divorced. As the Chilean and Mexican cases demonstrate,
national culture has been “freed” from its utility for the education of
citizens only to be doubly instrumentalized by the state on behalf of
capital.
In this article I want to recover the link between cultural and educational policy to understand the importance of the neoliberal state’s
discursive institution of culture as capital. On this view, neoliberal
cultural policy—like neoliberal education policy—is a tool for the formation of workers who act as bearers of human capital and entrepreneurs of the self. I do not intend to outline the effects of cultural policy
on the arts nor will I attend to the friction between state policies and
the creative uses and misuses citizens make of them. Rather, cultural
policy will serve as a window onto the pedagogy of the neoliberal
state.2 If education is the primary process by which societies reproduce themselves, education today has become a process by which subjects internalize the objective conditions of capitalist existence and its
corresponding legitimation narratives. Invoking the pedagogy of the
neoliberal state seeks to capture this vice grip of neoliberal governmentality, from above and internalized from below.
As it is deployed by neoliberal states, culture should acculturate
subjects to their status as precarious, flexible, self-managing, and self-
valorizing workers, whether in the form of human capital or informal
labor. Neoliberal cultural policy in Chile treats culture as a form of
capital, presupposing and teaching the countability and accountability of ever-wider realms of life. In Mexico, the valorization of culture
mirrors the increasingly direct valorization of informal economies, and
the challenges of calculating either make both into vehicles for corruption, that is, a form of informal governance by the deregulatory neoliberal state. The two processes are complementary: the increasingly
indirect valorization of self-valorizing labor allows for the increasingly direct valorization of spheres previously deemed marginally economic or noneconomic. Likewise, the calculability and accountability
of culture in Chilean cultural policy and the incalculability of Mexico’s
culture-of-favor cultural policy are but two sides of one coin issued by
the same neoliberal state form. Both depend on the discursive institution (from above) of culture as cultural capital and labor as human
capital reflected (from below) in the formation of Latin American subjects to contemporary capitalism.
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NEOLIBERALISM, CAPITAL AND STATE
Many thinkers dispute the common belief that neoliberalism signifies decreased state intervention into national economies. Instead, they
see it as the latest iteration of a governance that blends the violence of
state sovereignty with economic coercion and control (Brown; Davies;
Harvey) that emerges at the dawn of the modern era (Foucault; Vogl)
if not earlier (Graeber 2011). As my invocation of the neoliberal state
makes clear, I agree with this analysis. In the overdeveloped world,
one could be forgiven, however, for thinking that neoliberalism has
signified the retreat of the state, given the dismantling of once robust
social provisioning regimes over the last forty years. From the perspective of the underdeveloped world, where neoliberal policies often
have been brutally imposed, there can be no doubt that the state is
neoliberal capitalism’s henchman. My focus in this article on the neoliberal state derives in part from this clarity from the peripheries of
global capitalism.
By invoking the imaginary of the neoliberal state, my focus is as
much on how contemporary capitalism actually works as on how neoliberalism thinks it works. In the terms of an older lexicon, I will focus
as much on the (state) superstructure as on the (economic) base. It is
not merely that some state cabal willfully misrepresents a neoliberal
agenda to a naïve or apathetic citizenry; functionaries at all levels of
governance—from central bankers to elected representatives—believe
that deregulation frees the market’s invisible hand, that less government promotes freedom and democracy, and that these are synonymous with the market. The same is true of a concept like human capital,
which has little room in a Marxist political economy and may even be
incoherent on neoclassical grounds.3 Nonetheless human capital theory has gained tremendous influence over the last seventy years, filtering down from the cupolas of economic theory into every firm that
boasts a human resource department and even into many individuals’
self-concepts.
Just as Marx adopted the perspective of liberalism in order to point
out the contradictions of industrial capitalism, so should we inhabit
the logics of neoliberalism in order to point out those same contradictions now differently disguised. In short, I propose an immanent critique of the ideology of the neoliberal state on its own terms in order
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to show how cultural policy propagates a neoliberal rationality in
which, among other things, labor has been discursively transformed
into human capital, culture is similarly instituted as cultural capital,
and both are therefore made to self-valorize. One of the premises of
this article is that falsehood is better dismantled by temporarily adopting its premises in order to scuttle it on its own terms. On this plane
of self-representation, then, we can pose the question that serves as
our point of departure: How can the neoliberal state legitimize subsidizing culture while simultaneously dismantling other social welfare
regimes? What logic would explain the state’s social provisioning in
some sectors with rampant deregulation in others?
Neoliberalism is a term that has become so multidimensional it
qualifies as what sociologists call an essentially contested concept. A
content analysis of articles in Latin American Studies (Boas and Gans-
Morse)—where the term has had the longest currency in the North
American academy—revealed that it may refer to a set of economic
policies, a development model, an ideology, or an academic paradigm.4
Unlike other essentially contested concepts, in these papers neoliberalism often goes undefined. Perhaps more troubling is its asymmetrical usage across ideological divides (140); only one group, Chile’s
Chicago Boys, positively identified as neoliberal, and even for them
the term signified both a set of economic development policies and
staunch anticommunism. The authors point out, “When the use of language expresses only one side of a politically charged argument, choice
of terminology takes the place of a direct confrontation of ideas” (139).
This problem of definition is compounded by the fact that critiques of
an ill-defined neoliberalism often focus on its political dimensions at
the expense of its economic ones. This in turn overemphasizes neoliberalism’s novelty, which extracts it from longer histories of capitalism,
such that these critiques often harbor the desire to return to a gentler
form of capitalism (e.g., a Keynesian welfare state) and not the desire
to overcome it.5
Debates over terminology may seem pedantic, but discursive shifts
can have real effects. For example, the expansion of economic calculus
or the institution of culture and labor as cultural and human capital
begin in the discursive realm. The circulation of these terms and their
metaphorical linkages pioneer the conceptual colonization that differentiates neoliberalism from liberalism—political-economic ideologies
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to be sure, but ideologies about the ways that capital thinks it works
that inflect the ways that capital actually works. For these reasons, it
behooves us to interrogate the self-understanding of the neoliberal
state and inhabit its logics to begin to identify its immanent contradictions even as we bear in mind the loose coupling of the logics of state
and the secular logic of capital (i.e., the tendency of the rate of profit to
fall) that drives the former in the last instance.

CULTURE, RESOURCE OR CAPITAL?
Students of cultural policy have sought to explain how culture is subjected to bureaucratic management in the neoliberal era. George Yúdice
offers one of the most widely circulated theories in his 2003 study of
cultural policy in the Americas, The Expediency of Culture. Yúdice identifies a shift, starting in the 1990s, toward utilitarian and then performative conceptions of “culture as resource.” He claims, “Culture is
being invoked to solve problems that previously were the province of
economics and politics” (25). Specifically, it is “wielded as a resource
for both sociopolitical and economic amelioration, that is, for increasing participation . . . conflicts over citizenship . . . and the rise of . . .
‘cultural capitalism’” (9). In addition to the compensatory utility of culture for the ills of neoliberal globalization,6 Yúdice believes that “cultural expediency underpins performativity as the fundamental logic of
social life today,” which he understands as the asymptotic approximation of (individual) behavior to (social) norms and models (28, 32; my
emphasis). Performativity supersedes instrumentality as the logic of
capitalist society—just as Yúdice supersedes Adorno and Horkheimer’s
culture industry critique—pointing to the dawning of a postmodern
episteme (4, 31). This performative logic of the social is particularly
troublesome because it allows for creatively destructive, disorganized,
or disruptive capitalism to feed off of failures to correctly approximate
social models (33–34), such that social and cultural differences and
even willful subversion are valued as much as conformity.
According to Yúdice, this far-reaching transformation centers on
the notion of culture as resource (31, 35). Given its centrality to his argument, his usage of the term is rather slippery. He seems to understand
“resource” variously as a technology—in the Heideggerian sense of a
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“calling-forth” or “enframing” of the phenomenal world (26–27)—as
a tool of governance—specifically of a Foucauldian biopolitical governmentality—and in a sense akin to natural resources (1). It becomes
possible to think of culture as a resource when it is utilized as a political expedient by governments, civil society organizations, and private
enterprise, that is, when it becomes a means to governmental ends (38).
Indeed, comparing culture to resource, and natural resources in particular, is important for Yúdice, because it implies a rationality, at once
economic and ecological, that reflects a set of managerial behaviors
including conservation, distribution, and investment (1,4).7 In this, it
seems to me that Yúdice places too much emphasis on governance
while overlooking the accompanying ideological shifts in the mode of
capital accumulation.
This is not to say that Yúdice disattends to the economic utility of
culture-as-resource. He recognizes that “labor stands at the heart of
culture” (330). He rightly extends the notion of cultural labor beyond
cultural producers to management, education, and most importantly,
the attention of consumers (331). He rightly points out that cultural
labor is not merely exploited but often freely given (337). During the
1990s, culture in the broad anthropological sense (see note 2) was also
increasingly commodified as postindustrial northern economies pioneered modes of capital accumulation founded largely on the production of immaterial goods and services. Although Yúdice does not make
the point, the logic of commodification grounds his comparison of culture to natural resources insofar as both cultural and natural resources
are market externalities whose free inputs (e.g., raw materials, social
reproduction, cooperation) are nonetheless essential to capitalist production. By invoking this logic he follows Frederic Jameson and the
Frankfurt School (despite his claims to the contrary) in seeing contemporary capitalism as transforming into commodities, “whatever quality
or use value is left” (332).
Yúdice insists, however, that culture-as-resource is more than mere
commodity; it is “a mode of cognition. . . . that underpins performativity as the logic of social life today” (28). This raises an apparent
contradiction, for unless he is suggesting that what he calls the “cultural economy” supersedes capitalism—perhaps like those who see in
immaterial labor the seeds of communism—then the logic of the commodity cannot be escaped. It is clear that Yúdice’s cultural economy

41

42

B R E T L E R AU L

is but capitalism’s latest iteration. We can resolve this real contradiction between conceptions of culture as resource—which he associates with the performative logic of capitalist postmodernity—and
culture-as-commodity—that he associates with the instrumental logic
of capitalist modernity—if we take seriously the economic valence of
culture-as-resource.
It is not only that governments have come to manage culture like
land, natural resources, or nature. Nor is it merely that capital commodifies culture just as it does nature. Rather, neoliberal states treat
culture, land, and nature like capital. And while I agree with Yúdice
that cultural expediency is not merely political but performative insofar as it reflects an ethics of self-management in accord with models
(38), I differ by specifying capital as the preeminent model. Culture
is a resource less in the sense of natural resources and more in the
sense of human resources. Once market externalities that provided
free inputs to capitalist production and sites for its material waste and
psycho-social excess, nature and culture are incorporated into the
neoliberal logic of capital accumulation insofar as they can be made
to perform as capital, where we understand capital in mainstream
terms as any produced thing capable of performing economically useful work. In short, nature, culture, and labor perform as capital, which
performs work. Labor and its human bearers are absent from this picture, for labor now also performs as capital. Where Yúdice speaks of
performativity, I will speak of discursive institution. I contend that the
specifically neoliberal character of culture is its discursive institution as
capital, itself premised on the same shift to capitalist society’s fundamental category: the discursive institution of labor as human capital.
Like Yúdice’s claim that culture is treated as a resource, my claim
that culture is treated as capital adopts the viewpoint of the neoliberal
state and its cultural policy bureaucracy. The cultural policy that promotes such a view facilitates the ongoing originary accumulation of a
cultural sphere much larger than mere storehouse of bourgeois modernity’s aesthetic commodities. This accumulation takes place under
the ideological cover of economistic mathesis and a calculating rationality fueled precisely by the challenges of valuing culture-as-capital
that, much like its cousins fictitious and human capital, requires constant calculation to police the boundaries of its discursive institution. As a result, countability substitutes for (aesthetic) judgment and
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accountability substitutes for ethical responsibility. In this way neoliberal cultural policy acculturates workers to our value as (human) capital. To explore this series of claims, I turn to my first case study, Chile’s
National Council for Culture and the Arts (CNCA), the predecessor
institution of the recently created Ministry of Culture.

CHILEAN CULTURAL POLICY
To better understand Chilean cultural policy today, we must briefly
return to the roots of the neoliberal state in dictatorship. In this longer
historical view, the neoliberalization of cultural policy appears as a
dialectical process occurring between state and market preeminence
and sociocultural integration and disintegration. Cultural sociologists
Gonzalo Catalán and Giselle Munizaga have helpfully periodized cultural policy under the dictatorship into two phases. The first phase
(1973–76) was characterized by cultural policies that promoted nationalist integration through the militarized authoritarian state’s reconsolidation of Chilean identity through the promotion of elitist and
hierarchical modes of restricted cultural production. This reactionary
first phase sought to negate the cultural dynamic under Eduardo Frei
Montalva’s progressive Christian Democratic administration (1964–70)
and, especially, Salvador Allende’s socialist administration (1970–73),
which, in the authors’ ventriloquism of the Chilean right, marked “the
deepest and most aberrant threat ever faced by both the nation’s identity and its cultural heritage” (7).
The second phase (1976–82) saw the resurgent autonomy of cultural production from the state midwifed by reconsolidated art markets for both restricted and mass cultural production. According to
Catalán and Munizaga, this period is also one of increasing market
segmentation and stratification of consumer publics and of canons
of taste (42). The liberal economic policies of the first phase become
ideologically dominant in the second phase, with the market coming
to supplant the state as the driver of cultural “policy.” We could extend
this second phase up to the restoration of democracy in 1990.
I would like to suggest a third phase (1990–2011), in which we see
cultural policies aimed at national integration8 but now under the twin
rubrics of democracy and free market fundamentalism. The balance
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between the two favors liberal economic ideologies so that cultural
segmentation keeps pace with gaping income inequality and finally
gives rise to a state-sponsored cultural policy that presumes the market value of culture. We might call this the period of “consumer citizenship” in which cultural consumption supplants national identity
as the binding agent between people and state. From this brief sketch
of the evolution of Chilean cultural policy since 1973, I turn to a closer
reading of current policy in order to see how Chilean cultural policy
promotes the valorization of culture-as-capital.
Initially proposed under the first postdictatorship administration
of Patricio Aylwin (1990–94), the National Council for Culture and the
Arts (CNCA) was finally created in 2003 out of the Ministry of Education. Only thirteen years later, the government approved its transformation into the Ministry of Culture. The CNCA and Ministry of
Culture are but the latest examples of a series of state organisms for
the oversight of culture that began with the founding of the National
Library in 1813, just three years after Chile’s declaration of independence. Where previous institutions promoted reception (Ministry of
Education), preservation (Dibam),9 mass cultural production (Corfo),10
and restricted cultural production (Fondart),11 the CNCA and, now,
Ministry of Culture combine and coordinate these activities. We see in
this progression not only increasing state involvement in cultural production but also a shift from a focus on cultural products to cultural
production, and within the latter, a shift from corporate to individual
production. I would like to suggest that this progression results from
the operationalization of the notion of human capital and its application to the field of cultural production.
In making this point, it will be helpful to compare the two reports
published by the CNCA, Chile quiere más cultura. Definiciniones de política
cultural 2005–2010 (Chile wants more culture: Cultural policy definitions 2005–2010) (2005) and Política cultural 2011–2015 (Cultural policy
2011–2015) (2011). At first glance, the documents exhibit very different tones. The 2005 report speaks in lofty terms about the flowering
of the arts after “the cultural blackout” of the dictatorship (3). Its policy principles are firmly rooted in the language of liberal humanism, pluralism, and the consensus politics of Chile’s long—by some
accounts, incomplete—transition to democracy. As such, it lends itself
to ideology critique. For example, the line “our culture aspires to know
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and make itself known, to relate and exchange with other, more distant cultures, especially those of the Asian Pacific,” (CNCA 2005, 15)
could just as well be Chilean trade policy attending to the meteoric
rise of the Chinese economy.
Although the 2011 policy report espouses the same principles, it
does so in an alienating, bureaucratic jargon. It is as if the ideological
gloves had been taken off to reveal the CNCA’s nature as an apparatus of the state for the technocratic management of culture. For example, the 2005 report’s “Autonomous and democratic participation of
the citizenry in cultural development” (CNCA 2005, 13) is now divided
in three: “Access to public information, to the free circulation of culture and its dissemination”; “Equal opportunity to enjoy and participate in cultural and artistic life”; and “Freedom to choose and exercise
cultural practices” (CNCA 2011, 52). The political subject of the 2005
principle—an autonomous and democratic citizenry—is replaced by
activities and relations—“access,” “equality of opportunity,” and “freedom to choose”—that position the now absent subject of Chilean cultural policy before a marketplace of cultural products to be consumed
or produced. Similarly, the 2005 principle, “The indispensable role and
responsibility of the State” (CNCA 2005, 13) becomes by 2011, “Respect
for a State that facilitates opportunities to access culture and that subsidizes cultural activity deemed to be a substantial contribution to the
development of the country” (CNCA 2011, 53)—this in a section where
the report’s authors allow themselves to imagine “the country we want
to see” (51). The 2011 qualification of the “role of the state” makes
clear what is only latent in the 2005 report: The state intervenes in the
cultural sphere only so far as to incentivize a marketplace of cultural
goods and promote “development,” which in the context of this prose
might be confused for economic development. To be sure, the 2005
report makes a similar point if obliquely. But couched in the language
of liberal humanism, the appeals to freedom of expression and consumer choice appear more like assurances that the newly created CNCA
is neither state propagandist nor censor. In the bureaucratic language
of the 2011 report, the same sentiment comes across as a matter-of-fact
affirmation of culture as both marketplace and development capital.
Finally, despite its lofty language, the policy recommendations
made in the 2005 report are as concrete as modifying a particular law
(CNCA 2005, 19) or establishing a performing arts center in Santiago
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(17). By contrast, the list of “proposals and strategies” in the 2011
report are as toothless as “Actions will be promoted for the formal and
informal training of artists” (CNCA 2011, 55). This could well indicate
the CNCA’s increasing institutional autonomy (i.e., bureaucratization)
over the five years of operation that separate the two texts. It also
points to the CNCA’s primary discursive production in the intervening years: its annual statistical compendia.

CULTURE, COUNTABLE AND ACCOUNTABLE
Perhaps more important than the CNCA’s policy recommendations is
its work measuring Chilean culture. Since its 2003 founding, the CNCA
has commissioned annual surveys of culture from the National Statistics Institute (INE). The Informes de estadísticas culturales (Cultural statistics reports) employ a methodology first elaborated in the Marco
de estadísiticas culturales, Chile 2012 (Framework for cultural statistics,
Chile 2012) (MEC) (2012), which sought to “identify the limits of the
measurable” (CNCA and INE 2015, 11). Take, for example, the report’s
summary of findings for the cultural domain of “Literary arts, books,
and journalism.” Here, the report points out the tension between “art
and cultural industry” or between a “literary market/ non-market”
(CNCA and INE 2015, 15). According to the authors, the primary strategic interest of the art camp is to encourage readership and its primary
actors are public libraries and “reading clientele” (lectores usuarios,
literally “reader-users”) (15). The primary strategic interest of the culture industry camp is to support bookstores “taking as its object the
creation of a book industry that actualizes writers as cultural economic actors; its anchor are bookstores and its object readers who buy
books” (15). In this framing of the domain, there are two key data
points: the number of readers and the number of book buyers. This of
course leaves out what its authors deem immeasurable: the motivations of target actors’ enumerated behaviors (reading books and buying
books), such as understanding, knowledge, status, edification, appreciation, or pleasure.
The report recognizes as much. It begins the presentation of its
methodology by referencing what it calls the “iceberg model of culture”
developed by the UNESCO Working Group on Cultural Statistics in
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Latin America. On this model, 90 percent of culture is either “below the
surface”—such as “tacit rules, things that take some time to recognize,
ways of thinking”—or “deep”—such as “unconscious rules, ways of
‘feeling,’ things that can only be recognized when one is familiar with
the culture” (CNCA and INE 2015, 11). In the four hundred or so pages
of each statistical report, it is easy to forget that these numbers capture
only a small portion of the 10 percent of cultural phenomena that are
deemed measurable. As we can see in the summary of the cultural
domain “literary arts, books and journalism,” measurable culture is the
basis of an implied cultural policy. By the time these reach the level of
actual policy formation, they have taken the form of technocratic imperatives: “to generate access to artistic-cultural offerings” by subsidizing demand, and “making visible and fomenting the culture industries
as a motor of development” by promoting research into supply chains
and strengthening distribution networks (CNCA 2011, 56). Oddly, the
policy recommendations make no reference to these statistics.
If the statistical compendia play only a minor role in the formation of explicit cultural policy, what is their function? I would suggest
that the CNCA’s statistical output—its primary textual product available to the public, at least in quantitative terms—has two functions
with the same goal.
The first function is to “institute” culture in the semantic sense
that French sociologist Luc Boltanski gives the term. For him, an institution is a “bodiless being whose role is above all to establish the silent,
semantic commons of communication, beyond the contract of sender
and receiver” (2011, 75). This primary semantic function of institutions rests on the illocutionary force of “denominating the whatness
of what is” (75), which must be carefully distinguished from the material force of administrations’ policing functions and organizations’
coordinating functions (79). In this sense, the CNCA is an organization that seeks to coordinate cultural production, but its key function
is its particular institution of culture: to denominate that what counts
as culture is culture that can be counted.
The second function is pedagogical. The CNCA and INE’s compendia are in fact summaries of statistics provided by reporting institutions, and the MEC methodology relies on cultural managers and
producers from each field for its basis and revision. The gathering
and coordination of cultural actors not only serve to construct but
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also to promote the state’s institution of countable culture. Estadísticas
culturales. Informe annual 2015 relates that in one meeting on statistical methodology, it became clear that the conceptual axes of cultural
domain and cultural cycle “have not been internalized by all cultural
agents in the sector nor by all the cultural institutions and organizations in the country” and that one of the CNCA’s primary goals should
be “the dissemination of these concepts and training about them” (4).
Clearly, the state’s statistical rendering countable of culture is not only
the result of its work with cultural agents; it also works on them. Culture’s categorization, standardization, and quantification are not merely
descriptive but performative; they institute and teach that culture is
countable and accountable. This pairing points out how mechanisms
of control are devolved to individual cultural actors so long as their
self-control can be audited, a key characteristic of neoliberal governance (Power). It also helps explain the gap between the imperatives
of Chilean cultural policy and the statistical description of culture: the
former represents state action from above; the latter lays the groundwork for self-governance from below. Together these positions constitute the vice grip of neoliberal governmentality.
Despite the developmentalist paradigm that legitimated Chile’s
CNCA, its policy reports are not primarily about culture as a driver of
economic progress. Of course, certain policies, such as those related to
culture industries, tourism, and the defense of intellectual property
rights, are motivated by economic concerns, but they constitute a fraction of the whole. Moreover, the coordination and administration of
the economics of culture are shared with other more established ministries such as those of education, finance, and economy, development,
and tourism. I have suggested that the CNCA and its publications play
a more ideological role for the reproduction of contemporary Chilean
capitalism. It remains to be seen how the institution and promulgation of culture as countable and accountable is specifically neoliberal.

CAPITAL, CULTURAL AND HUMAN
I outlined above the economic and political approaches to the essentially contested term neoliberalism. And I questioned Yúdice’s conception of culture-as-resource while retaining the primacy of its expediency
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for neoliberal states in the form of culture-as-capital. Finally, we saw
just how Chile’s nascent cultural policy institutes culture as capital by
making it at once countable and accountable. Now, I want to clarify
the historical and analogical relationship of the discursive institution
of culture as cultural capital to the discursive institution of workers
as bearers of human capital. Ironically the challenges of quantifying
culture, like the challenges of quantifying human capital investment,
mean that both must be constantly counted. This constant counting
of culture is essential to the discursive institution of culture as capital. Ultimately, I want to suggest that the expediency of culture in the
imaginary of the specifically neoliberal state rests on the speculative
nature of its value. It should come as little surprise, then, that the
institution of culture as capital and labor as human capital parallel the
financialization of the Chilean, Mexican, and world economies since
the 1980s.
My analysis of the CNCA, its cultural policies and statistical compendia focuses on “neoliberalism from above”—actions that can be
attributed to state and supranational organizations like the UN, GATT,
IMF, and WTO. But in order to fully understand neoliberalism, we
must attend to what Argentinean political theorist Verónica Gago calls
“neoliberalism from below.”12 Indeed, the key to neoliberal governance
is the individual’s (Foucault) or organization’s (Power, 41–42) internalization of social control experienced as the “freedom” to act on the
market. For this reason, I have suggested that the Chilean state’s institution of culture as capital has a pedagogical role. Pedagogy is but a
technology for governance whereby an educational patient internalizes modes of thinking and conduct at the behest of an educational
agent.
What binds these two levels of neoliberal governmentality? What
lesson does the CNCA want to teach? Gago suggests that neoliberalism from above and neoliberalism from below find in calculation
a common rationality. Neoliberalism in Gago’s reading of Foucault
rests on a resignification of freedom. “What is neoliberal is the positioning of this freedom as the basis of the calculable” in other words
“the inclusion of the incalculable as the stimulus for a calculating
rationality” (2017, 163). For Gago this rationality is the primary means
by which neoliberal subjects govern themselves, at the very least
rendering themselves auditable. We can now say that Chile’s CNCA
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teaches a similar lesson: that the purportedly incalculable realm of
freedom—in this case cultural heritage and artistic expression so often
figured as the aesthetic excess of political economy (Caygill; Beech)—
becomes the basis of a calculating rationality such that culture becomes
a naturalized, self-organizing sphere of ordered freedom not unlike
the marketplace.13
I should briefly clarify that in this schema culture was never in
fact free from political economy, although it was largely untreated by
economics. Moreover, that which is not counted is just as constitutive
of capitalism as that which is. Its constitutive exclusion makes it part
of capital even while it may be noneconomic, where capital is understood as a social relation and economics as the quantitative construction and mediation of that social relation and its parties.14 So, when
I speak of the expansion of economic calculus into traditionally incalculable realms—for example, the discursive institution of culture as
cultural capital—this is not to suggest that these realms were previously outside the capital relation, only that now they are recognized
and cultivated by states as means for enhancing the performance of
economically useful work, to use the mainstream definition of capital.
The discursive institution of culture as capital describes not its becoming
economic, but its economic utility coming to be known and exploited. At the
same time, discursive institution is a tool of ongoing originary accumulation, the colonial logic of capitalism’s extensive mode of expansion that counteracts its secular logic (i.e., the tendency of the rate of
profit to fall).
The neoliberal critique of liberalism turns on the question of labor
and its attendant theory of value. Economists like Gary S. Becker,
Milton Friedman, Jacob Mincer, and Theodore W. Schulz sought to
transmute labor into human capital by bringing wider fields of human
activity under the purview of economic calculus—everything from
education and health to personal relationships and psychology. If
calculation animates capitalist rationality generally, in the neoliberal
era, human capital is calculation’s primary agent and object. To be
sure, the notion of human capital was not unknown to classical economists. In the 1930s, Mincer discovered the seed of human capital theory in the pages of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations (Adamson, 272).
Marx had already declared the absurdity of thinking of labor-power as
interest-bearing capital and wages as interest (1981, 596). The neoliberal
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difference is not only the individualization of the concept but also the
speculative quality of its corresponding values.
As the labor-capital relation was the linchpin of liberalism, human
capital-finance capital is the axis of neoliberalism. As Michel Feher
argues, Becker and Schulz conceived human capital in preneoliberal
terms of utility, that is, return on investment in the form of income (27).
Today, the goal is less maximizing utility in the form of profit than maximizing short-term capital appreciation, a behavior we see in finance
capital’s speculative tendencies. Returns on individual human capital
investment can be readily calculated in the form of earned income.
Indeed, human capital theory sought to explain personal income distribution (Mincer 1958). The appreciation of human capital, however,
is more elusive, calling for speculation about the future marketability of a skillset, conduct, or disposition. Therefore, our continual subjectification as human capital depends on the constant appraisal and
appreciation of our volatile value (Feher, 28; Martin, 95).
The expansion of economic calculus into the realm of culture is
similarly speculative. “Speculation” here plays on the term’s financial
and philosophical valences, for the short-term appreciation of human
or cultural capital investments (i.e., speculation in their price) depends
on their prior conversion into assets, a decidedly speculative act of
discursive institution. It would seem that the more speculative the
investment, the more often the asset’s value must be calculated as if
by some ritual incantation intended to shore up belief in an absent
god. Both labor and culture require constant calculation in order to
police their discursive institution as human and cultural capital. For
example, the explosive growth of global art markets since the 1980s—
especially the use of artworks as investment vehicles—and the skyrocketing cost of higher education (a key lever for human capital
investment) can be seen as speculative investments in risky assets.15
Returning to our first case study, we might say that the CNCA’s cultural policy not only teaches the calculability of culture-as-capital. The
institution of culture as capital teaches the rationality of calculation
for the subjectification of workers as bearers, investors, and speculators in their human capital.
Thinkers have pointed out how the artist models the behaviors
of workers treated as bearers of human capital. In Michel Foucault’s
well-known analysis, the entrepreneur of the self is the subject of
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neoliberalism. Where once homo œconomicus laminated the subjectivity of the governed to liberal governmentality through the fantasy
of the laborer who freely sells his labor in equal exchange, now the
entrepreneur of the self supplies both capital and labor (226). Writing
about the North Atlantic, Sarah Brouillette argues that creative economy discourse also constructs the cultural worker as a model for a flexible, self-managed, self-valorizing workforce (2014, 6, 2). In the postwar
period, certain sectors of psychology and policymaking promoted artists, authors, architects, and designers as model “human capitalists,”
for whom self-valorization converges with self-actualization. And since
the 1980s, bestselling management gurus have helped translate human
capital theory into the self-entrepreneurial practices of “the creative
class.”16 In the same period, Brouillette argues that UNESCO makes a
similar shift, globalizing a model of cultural sector governance that
promotes the “supremacy of market-based imperatives, including the
imperative for individuals to organize and manage their creative careers
with minimal dependence on state-based supports” (2019, 109). As we
already know, Chilean cultural bureaucrats have looked to UNESCO
as a model, and Chilean cultural policy mirrors this same shift.
UNESCO and Chilean cultural policy and creative economy discourse represent changes in the capitalist organization of work from
the direct management of production to arm’s-length production, outsourcing, subcontracting, and other forms of downward risk distribution from large firms to smaller ones and from capitalists to workers.
Thanks again to the imposition of neoliberal policies at the end of a
gun, it should come as no surprise that Chile pioneered labor flexibilization, legalizing subcontracting in 1975. By the twenty-first century,
30 to 40 percent of the Chilean workforce was subcontracted, and only
30 percent claimed standard employment with benefits (Narbona, Páez,
and Tonelli, 1).
Assuming as I have that Chile’s cultural policy buttresses the edifice of its neoliberal mode of governance, what would explain the
almost thirty-year lag between the promulgation of Chile’s neoliberal
labor policy and its neoliberal cultural policy? One explanation could
be the government’s more recent efforts to foment an intellectual
property-intensive service economy—including the culture sector—
and concomitant levels of human capital, a transition represented by
Chile’s 2010 accession to the Organization for Economic Cooperation
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and Development (OECD), the high-income countries club. Another
explanation for the growing importance of cultural policy may be the
wearing thin of the narratives that legitimated Chile’s pacted transition from dictatorship to democracy. The massive protest cycles that
rocked the country in 2011 and again in 2019, by indicting the neoliberal university, state disinvestment in public health care, the unlivable
pensions of the country’s privately managed social security, and, most
recently, the high cost of public transportation relative to wages would
seem to indicate as much. If neoliberal cultural policy is deployed in
the place of social provisioning as a palliative for the social ills of contemporary capital accumulation, the protest cycle of the 2010s would
seem a propitious moment to found a Ministry of Culture.
The promulgation of culture as capital, like the discursive institution of human capital, reflects the intensive and extensive reorganization of production to stave off the falling rate of profit. Extensively,
global labor-value supply chains have displaced value production from
the once-industrial Global North to the Global South thanks to the
coordination of capitalist states to free the movement of capital across
national boundaries while blocking the movement of labor setting up
the conditions for the “global labor arbitrage” (Smith). Intensively,
surplus value is extracted through the super-exploitation of industrial
workers in the Global South and from flexible, self-managing workers
figured as bearers of human capital or entrepreneurs of the self.
These forms of self-management are not restricted to the immaterial laborer toiling in the overdeveloped service sectors of overdeveloped metropolitan economies. The self-management of value
production is central to informal economies and other nonstandard
forms of work. Whether the super-exploited worker at a Tijuana maquiladora, the subcontracted subway employee in Santiago, the university student in Concepción actively investing in her human capital, or
the tech entrepreneur in Mexico City investing sweat equity into a
start-up, their precarity has a common root in this extensive and intensive reorganization of global production. On this economic basis we
can link the precarious “human capitalist” of the advanced strata of
national economies to the precarious microentrepreneur toiling in the
informal economy. Below we will see how Mexico’s informal economy and the corruption of its cultural bureaucracy are consonant with
the informal governance of the deregulatory neoliberal state.
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MEXICAN CULTURAL POLICY
Mexico’s cultural policy has been more robust than Chile’s and that
of most other Latin American countries. The state has played a greater
role in civic and economic life stretching back to the colonial period,
when Mexico City was the capital of the viceroyalty of New Spain.
In the early twentieth century, the Mexican Revolution and seventy-
year rule of the PRI only consolidated the state’s centrality. As in
Chile, Mexican cultural policy began shortly after independence: protections for the rights of authors were enshrined in the 1824 Constitution, and the National Museum was founded in 1825. And as in Chile,
nineteenth-century Mexican cultural policy was largely subsumed to
educational policy.
Culture becomes an explicit state concern with the expansion of
the bureaucracy under the liberal autocracy of Porfirio Diaz (1876–1911)
and the founding of the Secretariat of Public Instruction and Fine Arts
in 1905. Although it did not survive the revolution (1910–1920), the
Secretariat and its first director, Justo Sierra, laid the foundations for
the cultural revolution of the 1920s promoted by José Vasconcelos who
directed, first, the Department of the University and Fine Arts and
then the Secretariat of Public Education (SEP), founded at his behest
in 1921. In the wake of the revolution’s social upheavals, Vasconcelos
promulgated a powerful new concept of the nation through cultural
policies that recruited intellectuals and artists to the project of a truly
nationwide education system. It was Vasconcelos who invited Diego
Rivera, José Clemente Orozco, and David Alfaro Siqueiros to paint the
walls of public buildings granting Mexican muralism a powerful platform to promote a specifically modern Mexican visual vocabulary. This
tight relationship between cultural nationalism and national education
would persist until the creation of the Secretariat of Culture in 2015. In
the intervening years, cultural bureaucracies multiplied: the Department of Fine Arts (1934) was later absorbed into the National Institute
of Fine Arts (1946), just as the Department of Historical Artistic and
Colonial Monuments (1930) transformed into the National Institute of
Anthropology and History (INAH) (1946), and others were founded
dedicated to specific media—Film (IMCINE), Radio (IMER), and television (IMEVISION) (1983)—and culture in general—the National
Council for Culture and the Arts (Conaculta) (1988), the National Fund
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for Culture and the Arts (Fonca) (1989), and National Center for the
Arts (Cenart) (1994).
Surveying this brief history, we can discern the progressive autonomy of cultural from educational policy by means of institutional multiplication and specialization. Upon the founding of the Secretariat of
Culture in 2015, intellectuals decried the divorce of culture and education as the death of the Vasconcelian project (Amador 2015). For
ninety years that project had provided cultural policy with a clear goal
(national identity) and the mechanism for attaining it (education). The
state’s pedagogical role under the PRI complemented its developmentalist policies—education and development being twin discourses born
of the nineteenth-century cult of progress. Divorcing cultural policy
from the reproduction of the social totality through state-mandated
education suggests that its purpose for the state has also changed.
This returns us to our guiding question: What is the insertion of culture into the imaginary of the neoliberal state?
To elaborate an answer in the Mexican context, we return to the
Secretariat’s immediate predecessor, Conaculta, for it was the deep recession of the 1980s and the administration of President De la Madrid
(1982–88) that began the process of neoliberalization continued under
subsequent administrations.17 Founded in 1988 by the presidential
decree of de la Madrid’s successor Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988–94),
Conaculta was the first attempt to coordinate the various institutes
and departments of state working in the cultural sphere through the
drafting of explicitly cultural policy. Those policies emphasized “the
decentralization of cultural goods and services and the creation of new
frameworks of co-responsibility” while closely adhering to the “criteria of efficiency and rationality that have guided the current reform of
the administration in all its areas” (Tovar, 77, 65). According to Rafael
Tovar y de Teresa, twice Chairman of Conaculta (1992–2000, 2012–
15) and later first Secretary of Culture (2015–16), decentralization and
co-responsibility were the pillars for the council’s “modernization”
of Mexican cultural policy (77). His Modernización y política cultural
(Modernization and cultural policy)(1994) is a fascinating document,
for unlike policy briefs it provides an official account of the ideological justification of Conaculta’s cultural policy during his long tenure.
Officially speaking, Conaculta’s creation was a response to globalization. Mexican cultural policy would guard, on the one hand, against
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the “threat of uniformity” posed by globalization and, on the other,
against “the resurgence of exclusionary fundamentalisms and traditionalisms” (Tovar, 12). In accord with Yúdice’s thesis, Tovar’s formula makes cultural policy a palliative for the social ills resulting
from neoliberalization. It also quarantines nationalism to the cultural
sphere preventing the emergence of an economic nationalism that
might impede economic liberalization, accumulation by dispossession,
and the upward redistribution of wealth engineered into NAFTA.
Tovar is explicit that cultural policy must bind culture to politics
and economics. In other words, it should serve as a tool of governance
and a motor of the neoliberal development model. To make this case,
he articulates a kind of cultural populism that pits an anthropological
notion of culture promoted by UNESCO and cultural policy bureaucrats against an aesthetic one.
The challenge for cultural policy has been to change and remake itself
into a field associated with economic and political life and not an addendum divorced from reality, a purely recreational activity for one privileged segment of society. Precisely because of its profound meaning as
the substrate of our identity and as feature of democracy and quality
of life, culture is not . . . a merely aesthetic or intellectual plaything, an
ornament or escape from society, but rather an indispensable point of
departure for modernization. (19–20)

Culture is the medium of social interaction—the anaphora “through
culture” peppers Tovar’s introduction (12–13)—and foundation of
national sovereignty (17). Thus, decentralization and co-responsibility
in culture become synonymous with the liberalization and democratization of “certain centralizing tendencies—inherited from the years
of the viceroyalty—and of paternalistic attitudes on behalf of the
State” (76).
The formula is a familiar one used time and again to justify the
dismantling of welfare states. So, too, is its pluralist justification,
whereby cultural inclusion and representation of marginalized groups
paper over the failure of the state to redress economic inequality and
political marginalization.18 Citing the state’s belated recognition of
Mexico’s “pluricultural composition originally nourished by indigenous communities” with the 1992 reform of the fourth article of the
constitution (Secretaría de Gobernación, 5), Tovar characterizes decentralization and coresponsibility as democratic and inclusionary. In fact,
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they co-opt each social class’s “capacity for cultural creation” to “identify the problems besetting them to satisfy their needs and find solutions best suited to their means and talents.” (76). Rather than state
action to redistribute wealth and power, Tovar tasks culture, understood as the medium of everyday life, with the resolution of social
ills. This devolution of social responsibility is among the hallmarks of
the neoliberal state, one often misperceived as the retreat of the state
altogether.
Although formally subordinate to the Secretariat of Public Education (SEP), Conaculta had no legal basis for its operation: it was the
product of presidential decree not congressional law, and its directors
were appointed by the president and served at his pleasure (Secretaría
de Gobernación, 12). Although formally it had no fiscal independence,
it received its budget directly from the president, bypassing the SEP’s
legal oversight (Bordat, 231). As such it marks the full albeit informal
autonomization and institutionalization of cultural policy. So much for
the official story.
The unofficial motivations for Conaculta’s institution by decree
lie in the fraudulent election of President Salinas de Gortari in 1988.
The consensus, even among PRI-appointed bureaucrats who served
in those first years, is that Salinas founded Conaculta in order to legitimate his rule by co-opting artists and intellectuals—traditionally a
powerful component of the PRI’s base—through presidential patronage (Ejea Mendoza; Bordat). Under Conaculta’s auspices, Salinas created the National Fund for Culture and the Arts (Fonca) one year later
to serve as the vehicle for that patronage. As for the criteria of efficient and rational management vaunted by Tovar, in fact Conaculta
duplicated many of the same functions already performed by the SEP,
INBA, and INAH, for the purpose, some have suggested, of skirting
the entrenched unions in the latter two institutions. Víctor Flores Olea,
first chairman of the council, later intoned: “Carlos Salinas de Gortari
wanted to give culture a leftist image to balance out everything he
was going to do in the economic field for the right” (Ejea Mendoza,
23–24). Mexican cultural policy changed little with the end of PRI rule
in 2000 (Bordat, 235–39). Conaculta continued to operate as a slush
fund and political expedient under the administrations of Vicente Fox
(2000–2006) and Felipe Calderón (2006–2012), both leaders from the
opposition National Action Party (PAN).
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Given these inauspicious beginnings, corruption was endemic to
Conaculta’s institutional culture under PRI and PAN governments
alike. Judges who sat on Fonca’s juries awarded funds to their disciples, friends, and (in several instances) to themselves; presidents dedicated hundreds of millions of pesos to archaeological preservation
projects that were never completed; and exorbitantly costly vanity
projects like the National Center for the Arts (Cenart) (1994) and The
Vasconcelos Library (2006) would be harried to early completions for
political reasons, forcing building contractors to take shortcuts that
severely limited the functionality of the buildings (García Bermejo,
52).19 After more than twenty years of growing budgets, “decentralization,” and “efficient” and “rational” reform (Tovar, 65–66), Carmen
García Bermejo, one of Mexico’s leading cultural journalists, estimated
that in 2011 some 85 percent of Mexican municipalities lacked any form
of state-sponsored cultural infrastructure (López García). Similarly, an
analysis (Ejea Mendoza) of the monies distributed by Fonca shows a
marked concentration of subsidies to older, individual Mexico City-
based artists indicating failed decentralization and distribution. The
newly formed Secretariat now rests on firm legal footing since the passage of the long-awaited Law on Culture in 2017. It remains to be seen
to what extent the Secretariat will formalize Conaculta’s politics of
discretion and culture of favor.

CULTURE OF FAVOR AND INFORMAL GOVERNANCE
As Roberto Schwarz has pointed out in the case of late nineteenth-
century Brazil, key concepts in Western European liberalism, such as
the autonomy of the individual and of culture, were less implemented
by Latin America’s neocolonial elites than they were adopted “in an
ornamental vein as a proof of modernity and distinction” (28). Moreover, according to Schwarz, liberal European universalisms like the
rule of law served as “justification for what was unavoidably arbitrary
in a culture of favor” (23). This culture of favor describes how nominally free men and women—slavery was only abolished in 1888—in
fact depended on the wealthy for their material survival. Peripheral
modernities have always tended to prove the contingency of Western,
liberal “universalisms,” pointing to the yawning gap between laws
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and norms.20 In fact, this outwardly liberal, inwardly dependent culture of favor comports with Marx’s contemporary analysis of capitalism: outwardly, the free laborer sells his abstract labor to the capitalist,
when in fact he is compelled to do so by his separation from the means
of production, a separation reproduced in the process of capitalist production (1990, 724). We see the persistence of a culture of favor today
in so-called philanthrocapitalism, whereby increasingly concentrated
wealth combines with states’ retreat from social provisioning to place
welfare at the discretion of the wealthy.
Conaculta represented a bureaucratic framework for a state-
sanctioned culture of favor. Despite Tovar’s rhetoric, rather than modernize and democratize cultural policy, the council merely liberalized
it (Ejea Mendoza, 21–22). Liberalization is a survival strategy for discretionary or authoritarian regimes, like the PRI, through the piecemeal opening of spaces for participation and freedom of expression
in order to decompress an impending political crisis (O’Donnell and
Schmitter, 9). In the case of Conaculta, liberalization unleashed its culture of favor. By extending this analysis down from state cultural policy to the political economy that drives it, we can say that if liberalism
provided ideological cover for economic dependency in the form of
legal justification, neoliberalism does away with legal justification by
deregulating the purportedly self-regulating market. In this ideological framework, the laborer turned human capitalist and entrepreneur
of the self would be neither dependent on the favor of the wealthy nor
on the contractual mediation of that dependency. Rather, he would be
himself a capitalist, finally and truly free.
In the case of Chilean cultural policy, I recalled the claim that neoliberalism makes freedom the basis for economic calculation rendering
culture both countable and accountable. In the case of Mexican cultural
policy, that rationality of calculation remains embryonic as a tool for
governance.21 Rather the difficulty of quantifying culture made it an
excellent conduit for the PRI’s culture of favor and politics of discretion.
At the same time, using culture to ameliorate socioeconomic problems
makes the outcomes of those cultural-cum-social policies as speculative as the value of the policy instrument itself. In this way, the difficulty of counting culture frees the state from social accountability.22
Conaculta’s culture of favor can be understood as the governmental complement of Mexico’s persistent informal economy—around
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23 percent of GDP and 57 percent of workforce participation in 2014
(ILO 2014, 4). Informality has been a topic of scholarly interest since
mid-twentieth-century decolonization prompted a reevaluation of now
national economies by new state apparatuses.23 In the 1970s, anthropologist Keith Hart coined the term “informal sector” in his studies
of West African economies. And in the 1990s, it was Hart who began
to normalize informality as “part of the logic of postcolonial accumulation” (Denning, 90). While in 1993, The International Labor Office
had adopted a working definition of the informal sector, by the late
1990s, a cadre of affiliated statisticians began advocating clearer definitions of informality—including subtle distinctions between informal
sector, informal economy, employment in the informal sector, and informal employment—for the purposes of better measuring and ultimately
capturing values produced under its rubric (ILO, 6–9).24 Informality
signals the nature of the relationship between economy and state. As
such it has become a kind of ideological litmus test for neoliberal times.
“Neoliberal critics of state regulation have tended to celebrate the
informal sector, its micro-enterprises that need only micro-credit to
thrive. Defenders of social democratic-welfare states have advocated
the formalization of the informal: the extension of social protections
and representation in unions” (Denning, 90).
Both economic informality and culture present problems for the
measurement and calculation through which the power of the modern
state is exercised. While the informal sector functions by the same
logic as capital but below the radar of state management, culture
blends capitalist and other value systems.25 Until economists’ acceptance of contingent valuation methods in the 1990s (Throsby 2001, 24),
culture in the anthropological sense—for example languages, cultural
diversity, immaterial heritage, and life ways—was regarded as noneconomic—as opposed to already commodified cultural artifacts in the
aesthetic sense (e.g., artworks, books, films, performances). It is not
that culture is incalculable or that small-scale or illegal commerce is
noneconomic, it is simply that neither lends itself to straightforward
economic valuation. The same is true for human beings, which, as we
have seen, did not hinder the rise of human capital theory.26
The valuation of culture advocated by neoliberal cultural policy
mirrors the increasingly direct valorization of informal economies.
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Through the lens of Mexican cultural policy, the governmental rationality of Mexican neoliberalism can be understood as part of the institutionalization of discretionary politics and its incumbent culture of
favor justified by the ideology of deregulation and, in turn, the value
of informality in the political, cultural, and economic spheres. This adds
to the overdeveloped discourse on neoliberalism in the overdeveloped world an important lesson from the Global South that allows us
to think the neoliberal state as a global form: the neoliberal state exercises informal governance over informal economic subjects. This precarious workforce has always animated capitalist economies beneath
the representational capture of economic discourse just as the culture
of dependency lurks behind the fiction of contract law. As Marx recognized in articulating the general law of capitalist accumulation (1990,
798), the waged worker is necessarily a “virtual pauper” (1993, 604).

CALCULATION WITHOUT END
To recall, in the beginning of this essay, I argued that Chile’s cultural
policy teaches the calculability of culture-as-capital, and that culture-
as-capital, in turn, teaches the rationality of calculation for the subjectification of workers as bearers, investors, and speculators in their
human capital. The discursive institution of labor and culture as human
and cultural capital depends on the constant appraisal and appreciation of their values, for both are risky assets and investment in them
is often quite speculative. In this sense, human and cultural capital
resemble finance capital. In the second moment, I claimed that the
specifically neoliberal character of Mexican cultural policy since 1989
at once institutes informal governance as a model for the precarity of
making a living in a wholly deregulated or informal marketplace. In
closing, I would like to return to my earlier suggestion that the problems of measurement that facilitate a neoliberal cultural policy are
symptomatic of the most salient economic shift of the last fifty years:
the financialization of economies around the world, from the most
advanced to the most informal.
I have used Verónica Gago’s analytic “neoliberalism from below”
to describe the result of a pedagogical process of neoliberal subject
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formation. For the Argentinean theorist, however, “neoliberalism
from below” describes the financialization of everyday life from the
perspective of the low-capital, often informal economies characteristic of peripheral capitalism. Gago describes how, since Argentina’s
2001 financial collapse impoverished millions, a calculating rationality has become “the motor of a powerful popular economy that
combines self-managed community knowledges . . . as a technology
of mass self-entrepreneurship” (2015, 14). Calculation for mass self-
entrepreneurship is an ambivalent technology of (self) exploitation
and survival.
Exploitative calculation drives the financialization of popular life.
Credit and debt are two sides of the asymmetrical social relation that
grounds finance capital. Financialization can be defined as the extension of credit-debt relations into ever-greater realms of human activity,
from informal economies to everyday life.27 In contemporary capitalism, it becomes impossible to distinguish finance from production,
since finance has become integral to every sector of the formal economy.28 Informal economies, too, operate on credit circulating from
below and from above, the latter often in the form of banking microcredit or state subsidy. If liberalism rendered incalculable freedom
the basis of economic calculation by constraining it to the freedom to
act on the market, by modulating the debtor’s freedom to a field of
behavioral probabilities, financialized “debt economy” further refines
control over the incalculable by projecting calculable behavior into
the future.29 Insofar as a behavior is calculable, it is subject to audit,
the distributed form of social control by which neoliberal capitalism
processes the heightened risk of arm’s-length production and the self-
valorization of nominally autonomous entrepreneurs, many of whom
behave as bearers of human capital.30
While the credit-debt relation is central to the financialization of
these informal economies, it is not only because it modulates future
behavior compelling workers to self-valorize. In Latin America at large,
Gago and Mezzadra argue, an expanded notion of extraction is indispensable for understanding financialization. Finance does not organize
the production of value; it extracts value in the form of rent. Unlike the
extraction of surplus value in industrial capitalism, the extractive operations of finance capital are not directly involved in organizing and
managing the production process (Gago 2015; Gago and Mezzadra;
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Marazzi; Vercellone).31 To understand this, we need only consider the
debt collector who is not concerned with how the debtor returns the
principal and interest but simply that they are returned. As we have
seen, the extraction of surplus value is left to other capitalists, whether
firms in the Global South or “human capitalists” with little capital
beyond their skills, dispositions, and forms of cooperation. Thus, the
reprimarization of Latin American economies does not only herald
the region’s return to resource extractive capitalism in order to capitalize on high commodity prices buoyed by the growth of Chinese
industrial capital. Reprimarization also signifies a conceptual expansion of extractivism to include the extraction of rent not from the peons
who worked the latifundios or haciendas but from self-managing, self-
valorizing labor in the guise of human capital or the informal entrepreneur (Gago and Mezzadra, 588).Via this expanded understanding
of extractivism, we can return to the notion of culture-as-resource, but
only insofar as it is first discursively instituted as capital.
Before it can be invested in or rent extracted from it, culture must
be made countable and accountable. However, this transformation
that animates the cultural policy of neoliberal states may be as much
symptom as cause. Culture’s purported calculability historically parallels the increasing incalculability of our volatile, financialized economies. The insinuation of the valorization process into all aspects of
the life world does not rationalize it by making it calculable. It instead
indicates the irrationality of markets, the informality of neoliberal governance, the arbitrary violence, and contingent values that underpin
the whole crumbling edifice. Likewise, the calculability and accountability of culture in Chilean cultural policy and the incalculability of
Mexico’s culture of favor cultural policy are but two sides of one coin
issued by the same neoliberal state form.
This uncertainty not only about the measure of culture or finance
capital but over their very measurability32 summons the specter that
bourgeois economics and capitalism’s there-is-no-alternative apologists
have long sought to exorcise: the contingency of an economy founded
on politics. A truly political economy would breach the enclosure and
rigors of mathesis and opens economics to a war over measure.
Latin American cultural policy has always had a close relationship
to education. Even as developmentalist, neoliberal states like Chile and
Mexico have granted cultural policy greater institutional autonomy
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from education, it is still directed toward forming the citizen and
worker. Beyond their common instrumentalization of culture for social
cohesion and economic development, Mexican and Chilean cultural
policy operate by seemingly different logics. What unites them is that
they instruct the subject inside and out, teaching an inward disposition
toward one’s self and an outward disposition toward others. Inwardly,
subjects are taught to see themselves as entrepreneurs of the self,
immersed in constant calculation by which they self-manage the valorization of their labor. Outwardly, they are taught to accept the contingency and precarity of living at the behest of another’s favor, whether
of the capitalist, the politician, or the cultural bureaucrat. By this pedagogical process the neoliberal state forms a hinge between neoliberalism from above and neoliberalism from below. Its primary lesson is
the necessity of unending calculation.
Calculation is a means of survival for both the laborer as human
capital and the informal worker, two emblematic faces of Latin American neoliberal subjectivity; it is a way for the human capitalist to
monitor and control the radical contingency of her self-worth, a way
for the entrepreneur in the informal economy to negotiate the precarity of her subsistence. For Gago, there are “victims of the calculations
of others” (2017, 160), but those “victims” nonetheless exhibit a vitalist pragmatism that can turn calculation into a means of producing
lived realities in excess of those measured and meted out by the relentless drive to (self-) valorize, a pragmatism that can fit calculation to
the reproduction of life and not only to the reproduction of abstract
labor. As a tool for living, calculation can be wielded to produce and
sustain realities beyond measure, surplus (populations), (aesthetic)
excess (Gago and Mezzadra, 164).
We should heed Michel Feher’s call “to inhabit a certain mode of
subjection in order to redirect it or turn it against its instigators” (22)
just as Marx inhabited liberal capitalism’s subjection of life as living
labor in order to make the communist wager. The political subject of
neoliberalism—whether in the guise of the precarious entrepreneur
or bearer of human capital—can just as well appropriate the apparatuses of its subjection for its liberation.33 Calculation is a technology.
Like all technologies its social construction means it can be socially
de-and reconstructed. Today, the discursive institution of culture as
capital, like human or finance capital, is secured by little more than
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frenetic, unending calculation to paper over the contingency of our
political economy. The struggle tomorrow will be waged over the rubric
of measure.
Bret Leraul is assistant professor of comparative humanities at Bucknell University. He researches the politics and economics of cultural
reproduction and aesthetic education in contemporary Latin America. His writing has appeared or is forthcoming in A contracorriente;
Revista de Estudios Hispánicos; and LÁPIZ, Journal of the Latin American
Philosophy of Education Society.

Notes
1. According to Marx, the capitalist mode of production is the union of the
labor process, by which value is created, with the valorization process, by which
surplus value is extracted from that labor process. Valorization transforms the
money laid out in the production process into capital (Marx 1990, 283–306).
From the mystified perspective of the capitalist, capital appears as self-
valorizing (Marx 1990, 302, 1021) when, in fact, valorization takes place in the commodity labor-power whose use-value (labor) is the source of value. Since the free
worker possesses and sells his labor-power, the capitalist can only bring about its
productive consumption by causing the worker to labor (Marx 1990, 291; Tronti).
The general law of capitalist accumulation in turn compels a worker to sell her
labor by ensuring greater supply of labor-power than there is demand, generating
structural unemployment or what Marx called the reserve army of labor (1990,
793). This organization of the labor process by capital also subordinates the working class to the capitalist class, and it is these thoroughly political social relations
of production that underwrite capitalist production.
An individual may only be said to self-valorize if she has so thoroughly
adopted this mystified capitalist worldview that she identifies as a form of capital,
namely human capital. Just as capital conflates the labor process and the valorization process, by internalizing capitalist ideology, the worker comes to see herself as
both bearer of labor and manager of that labor often in the guise of the entrepreneur:
that is, the capitalist who must consume her own labor-power. Self-valorization is
then the self-management by labor of the valorization process. Thus, the source of
value appears as indistinguishable from the extraction of surplus value, which—
and this is the ruse—the bearer of human capital then renders unto another capitalist. In this paradigm, capital no longer needs to intervene in the production
process (e.g., supplying the means of production) except to subordinate the human
capitalist, for it has recomposed labor in its image such that the extraction of not
just absolute but also relative surplus value is carried out on its behalf by self-
valorizing human capital.
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The figure of human capital attempts to realize the capitalist’s dream, according to Mario Tronti, “to dismantle and recompose in his own image the antagonistic figure of the collective worker” (29). From the mystified perspective of capital,
the figure of human capital represents the sublation of the figures of the worker
and the capitalist and its subordination to finance capital. If the craftsman is formally subsumed under capital and the wage laborer is really subsumed, we might say
that the bearer of human capital is ideally subsumed for she represents capital’s highest dream and deepest delusion. This apparent dialectic (formal, real, ideal) gives
grounds for treating neoliberalism as a modality of capitalist production historically distinct from liberalism.
2. Cultural policy is riven by the two understandings of culture: (1) an
aesthetic conception of culture that arises with bourgeois modernity and whose
products, correspondingly, have been largely commodified, and (2) a broader
anthropological conception of culture, largely uncommodified, that has been promoted by UNESCO and cultural policymakers around the globe. Their distinction
largely belies the perspective I adopt here, that of cultural policy as education, for
aesthetic education inducts members of a community into a way of life.
3. For an early Marxist critique, see Bowles and Gintis (1975). For a more
recent heterodox critique but one grounded in the neoclassical literature, see Blair
(2018).
4. Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval (2013) understand these terminological
distinctions as describing neoliberalism’s functional multidimensionality. In addition to neoliberalism as ideology and as economic policy, they see it as productive
of social relations and of subjectivities. Taken together, these are “complementary
dimensions of a new global rationality” (3).
5. Annie McClanahan (511–
12) lodges a similar critique against Wendy
Brown’s notion of neoliberal rationality in Undoing the Demos.
6. It is important to note the different “local” inflections of the expediency of
culture. In the U.S., a latent utilitarian legitimation narrative emerges from behind
a nationalist one with the end of the Cold War and decreasing state subsidy for
cultural production (Yúdice, 11–12). In Latin America and other regions, Yúdice
points to the developmental role assigned to culture and promoted by supranational institutions like the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank
(13). In light of my guiding premise, then, we should note that in the overdeveloped world (specifically the U.S., since Yúdice makes no mention of European
cultural policy) culture as resource is tied to declining state subsidy, whereas in
the developing world it is tied to increasing investment, whether in the form of
national state subsidy, foreign investment, or foreign loans.
7. Throsby draws a similar analogy between natural and cultural capital
(69).
8. The primary cultural policies of this type are those that cultivate national
memory, such as the National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation (1990–91),
the National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture (2004, 2010–11), or
the Museum of Memory and Human Rights (2010). These policies are integrationist
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insofar as they seek to heal the wounds of state terrorism and to reconstitute Chilean national identity around that shared trauma.
9. Founded in 1927 as subsidiary of the Ministry of Public Education, the
Directorate of Libraries, Archives, and Museums (Dibam) drew together eleven
important institutions founded by public and private initiative since independence.
Although initially focused on cultural preservation and intellectual property rights,
in the 1950s the Dibam became an important actor in fomenting cultural diffusion
through its national network of libraries and museums.
10. Founded in 1939, the Corporation for the Advancement of Production
(Corfo) was the primary agent of import substitution industrialization, helping to
found and manage almost five hundred important firms in mining, heavy industry, utilities, and telecommunications sectors until most were privatized beginning
in 1973. Since 1990, Corfo largely oversees public funds that it entrusts to the private
financial sector for lending to businesses.
11. Founded in 1992, Fondart was the first state-sponsored grant program
for cultural producers. Law 18.891 founded the CNCA in 2003 and also diversified
grant offerings following the Fondart model.
12. In her research into the financialization of development through microfinance, Ananya Roy (2010) speaks of “neoliberal populism” and “the democratization of capital.” Both terms express social phenomena similar to “neoliberalism
from below,” but I prefer Gago’s term for its directionality. Roy’s account prioritizes the actions of bankers, states, and supranational organizations. This is reflected
in her choice of terminology: democratized capital reaches downward; populism
panders from on high to the will of the people. Both cast the poor as victims. By
contrast, Gago’s account emphasizes the ingenuity of the economically marginalized in creating their own financial networks and participating in their own self-
valorization and governmentalization.
13. If this recalls Pierre Bourdieu’s (1993) account of cultural modernity, one
might inquire into the historical and material conditions in which such a theory
is produced and circulates. It seems a small step to suggest that the expansion of
neoliberal ideology into the realm of culture may have fueled the worldwide dissemination of his notion of cultural capital, even if Bourdieu himself was a critic
of capitalism in all its guises.
14. Annie McClanahan (2017) makes a similar argument.
15. In 2009, average annual tuition in Chile was 47 percent of median family
income, a ratio only surpassed by the U.S. and the U.K. (Solis 2017, 566). Exorbitant
tuition was an immediate cause of the massive protest cycle that began in 2011 and
eventually succeeded in securing free tuition for up to 70 percent of Chilean university students.
16. The term “creative class” was coined by Richard Florida, who became
one of the most sought-after business and government consultants upon the publication of his bestselling book The Rise of the Creative Class.
17. The management and manipulation of economic crises is a central tool
for imposing and deepening neoliberal economic policy, whether through the debt
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peonage known as structural adjustment (e.g., Mexico 1995, Argentina 2001, and
many other developing economies) or through the socialization of private debt
and corporate risk that justifies the dismantling of social provisioning commonly
referred to as austerity (e.g., the U.S. and UK since the 1980s and many EU states
after 2008).
18. Nancy Fraser (2013) makes this same compelling argument with regard
to the status of women in the North Atlantic and the different approaches of
second-and third-wave feminism. See especially the essays in Part II.
19. Néstor Garcia Canclini’s (1987) general description of state patronage
in Latin America comports with the workings of Conaculta: “We often find this
patronage conception within the state apparatuses in countries that lack adequate
institutional structures for promoting culture or democratic organizations that
regulate the participation of producers. Thus, the administration of funds for culture and the arts is handled by some relative of the president or other ‘cultured
man’ of confidence, who distributes them to his friends or artists he admires according to personal criteria. On the basis of the current conception of what culture
policy should be, one could argue that patronage does not count as policy because
it is not organized in relation to collective needs” (30).
20. In the present day, one could see how this discrepancy contributes to
the high perception of corruption in many Latin American countries (Transparency International), since governments are judged within the paradigm of Western
liberalism.
21. The Mexican state has been collecting basic information about cultural
consumption since 1928. According to Nivón and Sánchez Bonilla, the lack of
coordination between the producing institutions and participation of the National
Institute for Statistics, Geography and Information (INEGI) demonstrate the Mexican state’s disinterest in generating cultural statistics (65).
22. Social anthropologist Marilyn Strathern (2000) makes the point that in the
audit culture that pervades neoliberal governance “the state’s evasion of accountability includes a call to account of those institutions which it funds” (5). This
indirect “new management,” which devolves accountability via “rituals of verification” (Power) borrowed from finance, only thinly veils a classic understanding
of the sovereign as that which creates law, can therefore act outside of it, and, by
virtue of that arbitrary power, is disinterested enough to judge those to whom the
law does pertain (Graeber, 190–96). For the inability to audit the results of the
auditing process, see Power.
23. To name but a few well-known thinkers from the period, Pierre Bourdieu’s early work (1963) took into account informal economies in colonial Algeria,
José Nun (1968) spoke of the “marginal mass” in Argentina, and Frantz Fanon
(2004) mobilized the category of the lumpenproletariat as a subject of revolutionary change against decolonial nationalists and internationalist communists alike.
24. The almost question-begging definition adopted by the ILO in 2002
describes the informal economy as “all economic activities by workers or economic units that are—in law or practice—not covered or sufficiently covered by
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formal arrangements” (8). In more practical and descriptive terms “employment
in the informal sector basically comprises all jobs in unregistered and/or small-
scale private unincorporated enterprises that produce goods or services meant for
sale or barter,” excluding agrarian work and some forms of domestic labor (3).
25. Barbara Herrnstein Smith speaks of the “double discourse of value,”
the complementary cost-benefit analyses at work in both the discourse of economic theory and the discourse of aesthetic axiology (125–34). Cultural Economist
David Throsby disaggregates cultural value into its constituent parts (e.g., aesthetic, historical, symbolic, and social value) with the goal of “operationalising
cultural capital in such a way that its importance alongside economic value may
be more vigorously exerted” (31).
26. In a 1989 lecture, Gary S. Becker, foremost advocate of human capital
theory and 1992 Nobel laureate for his work in the field, expressed his astonishment at the speed and breadth of its circulation: “It may seem odd now, but I
hesitated a while before deciding to call my book Human Capital. . . . In the early
days, many people were criticizing this term and the underlying analysis because
they believed it treated people like slaves or machines. My, how the world has
changed! The name and analysis are now readily accepted by most people not
only in all the social sciences, but even in the media” (16).
27. On financialization, compare Lapavitsas and Durand.
28. The example used by both Christian Marazzi (27–28) and Lazzarato (22–
23) is the automobile industry, that flagship of twentieth-century industry, which
is just as much about manufacturing cars as it is about the consumer credit that
allows us to purchase these cars by taking on debt.
29. See Lazzarato.
30. Power argues that institutional auditing is “relatively decoupled from
formal probabilistic risk assessment” (139) and therefore “a shallow ritual of verification” (123) that merely produces “certificates of comfort.” It thus constitutes a
real endangerment of neoliberal societies that have become dependent on auditing
to manufacture trust—a corollary, I would argue, of the intercapitalist competition
resulting from the human capital turn.
31. Marx makes a similar claim in a passage on the genesis of industrial
capitalism: “The public debt becomes one of the most powerful levers of primitive
accumulation. As with the stroke of an enchanter’s wand, it endows unproductive
money with the power of creation and thus turns it into capital, without forcing it
to expose itself to the troubles and risks inseparable from its employment in industry or even usury” (1990, 919). For Joseph Vogl, this indirect management of value
creation through finance transforms sovereignty into the wielding of moral hazard: “He is sovereign, who is capable of transforming his own risks into those of
others and who positions himself as the creditor of last resort” (251).
32. The social logic of financialization and the discursive institution of culture
and labor as cultural and human capital can be seen as another manifestation of the
myth of enlightenment. As Adorno and Horkheimer demonstrated long ago, the
mathematization of nature is the untruth of totalitarian enlightenment, for “when
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in mathematics the unknown becomes the known quantity in an equation, it is made
into something long familiar before any value has been assigned . . . . [E]ven what
cannot be assimilated, the insoluble and irrational, is fenced in by mathematical
theorems” (18). The equation of thought with mathematics endows thinking with
“absolute authority” at the same time it “is reified as an autonomous automatic
process, aping the machine it has itself produced, so that it can finally be replaced
by the machine” (19). The advent of automated trading and artificially intelligent
financial technology makes Adorno and Horkheimer’s claim seem prophetic.
33. This is what Gago, referencing Paolo Virno’s cynicism of the multitude,
calls the ambiguity or promiscuity of neoliberal rationality of calculation: “Then
speaking of neoliberalism from below is a way of accounting for the dynamic that
resists exploitation and dispossession and at the same time assumes and unfolds in this
anthropological space of calculation, which is in turn the basis for an intensification of that
exploitation and dispossession” (2015, 17).
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